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RECLAIMING REFUGEE RIGHTS AS 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Roni Amit* 
As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)1 
turns 70, many of the rights laid out in this once aspirational 
document have become well-established in treaty and customary 
international law.  One area where aspiration has not become reality, 
however, is in the realm of asylum.  Despite the UDHR’s 
proclamation that everyone has the right both to seek and to enjoy 
asylum (Article 14), refugee rights have not become human rights.  
In fact, a mere three years after the UDHR, the Refugee Convention2 
emerged with no corresponding right to asylum.  The result has been 
a lack of clarity over how refugee rights fit within the human rights 
framework.  As humanitarian crises around the world give rise to 
unprecedented levels of migration, this gap provides a space for 
states to evade their protection obligations and to place refugees 
outside of the rights framework.  
Refugee rights have always been somewhat at odds with the 
fundamental principles underlying the international human rights 
system.  Although conceptually based on the idea that individuals 
hold certain inalienable rights, the modern human rights system is 
premised on the idea of individuals making rights claims against the 
state.  Yet, the refugee’s defining feature is the absence of a state 
against which to make claims, what Hannah Arendt has termed “the 
right to have rights.”3  Having fled from the state against which they 
hold rights claims, refugees exist in a state of exception, standing 
outside of the law and relying on the prospect that a state’s 
humanitarian inclinations will outweigh security and economic 
interests.  
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1 G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 
10, 1948).  
2 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 
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3 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294 (1951). 
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For individuals in this situation, the Refugee Convention 
provides no right to asylum that they can assert.  In fact, unlike other 
human rights treaties, it does not adopt the language of individual 
rights at all.  Article 2, the only Convention article in which the 
refugee is the subject, focuses on the obligation of the refugee to 
their host country.  Rendering states as subjects, the remaining 
provisions employ the language of state obligations.  This language 
provides no scope for the individual refugee to make claims against 
the state. 
The language around asylum and refugee protection is rarely 
one of fundamental human rights.  Instead, refugees are discussed 
almost exclusively through the lens of the Refugee Convention and 
its concomitant state obligations.  The human dignity of the 
individual refugee is subsumed by the language of international 
relations as words like humanitarian crisis, burden sharing, 
sovereignty, security, and economics dominate the refugee debate.  
The individual stands apart from this debate.  A moving image such 
as a child washed ashore may briefly shift attention to humanitarian 
considerations, but the larger debate remains unchanged.  Outside 
of the refugee framework, the practice of human rights protection 
faces similar challenges rooted in state interests and the realities of 
the international system, but the conceptual framework remains one 
of individual rights.  By contrast, refugee law and its focus on the 
state render the refugee instrumental to other interests not just 
practically, but also conceptually.  
The dislodgment of individual rights by state interests stands 
only to be heightened amidst record numbers of forced migrants.  
With over 70.8 million displaced people,4 the assertion of individual 
rights gives way to questions of sovereignty and territoriality.  In 
this context, the Refugee Convention becomes an instrument not of 
refugee protection but of migration control.  The Convention’s focus 
on state obligations facilitates this process.  States do not deny the 
humanitarian imperative of the Convention, but they increasingly 
narrow the categories of individuals who are entitled to protection 
under this imperative.  The state-centric language of the Convention 
enables states to engage in interpretive sleights of hand to narrow 
                                                            
4 Figures at a Glance, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-
a-glance.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2019). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/5
2019] REFUGEE RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 559 
the Convention’s reach.  The result is that the bulk of migrants today 
increasingly fall outside of a state’s interpretation of who is a 
refugee.  To further minimize the humanitarian aspects of migration, 
states label those seeking protection as economic migrants or 
security risks.  
While states facing high migrant numbers have long engaged 
in this practice, the current migration crisis has facilitated its 
adoption on a global scale.  At the height of Zimbabwe’s 
humanitarian crisis in 2008 and 2009, for example, almost 300,000 
Zimbabweans sought asylum in South Africa,5 making it the top 
global recipient of asylum seekers.6  Ignoring the links between 
political dynamics and the humanitarian crisis, South Africa labelled 
all Zimbabweans as economic migrants.  Similarly, today 
individuals fleeing extreme gang-based violence, recruitment, and 
sexual slavery in the Northern Triangle countries of Latin America 
are treated as economic opportunists, criminals, and security risks, 
while gang-based persecution is excluded from the refugee 
definition in the US.  In Europe, a refugee who leaves Greece or 
Turkey in search of a more fully realized life accordant with human 
dignity acquires the status of an economic migrant—a status 
imposed in response to their pursuit of the fundamental right to 
dignity.  Even those fleeing Syria’s brutal civil war do not fall within 
the scope of the Convention’s refugee definition unless they are 
specifically targeted based on one of the protected grounds.  Even 
then, they must overcome the security risk label, an obstacle that is 
virtually insurmountable in the US as a result of the Muslim ban.  
The changing nature of rights violations has sparked calls to 
reform the refugee definition so that it aligns more closely with the 
types of threats currently giving rise to flight.  While well-meaning, 
this proposal comes with its own sets of problems.  First, any 
definition that continues to privilege certain types of harms over 
others without recognizing the fundamental rights of the individual 
will continue to have winners and losers.  In carving out a narrow 
humanitarian exception, the stage is set for states to continue to 
                                                            
5 Roni Amit & Norma Kriger, Making Migrants ‘Il-Legible’: The 
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define individuals out of this exception.  Moreover, states are 
unlikely to adopt an overly-broad definition that expands their 
obligation to accept migrants.  
But realpolitik is not the only reason that this solution holds 
little promise.  In the developing world, where most refugees are 
located, legal status may have little effect on an individual’s daily 
existence.7 Refugees and asylum seekers are largely unable to access 
rights guaranteed to them under both international and domestic law. 
The state-centered focus of refugee protection encourages states to 
meet their obligations by carving out exceptional spaces for refugees 
through camps, offshore facilities, and agreements with other 
countries to restrict movement.  Individuals may enjoy the bare 
minimum of refugee protection in these spaces—protection against 
refoulement—but they have no access to fundamental human rights.  
Instead, they live a liminal existence, unable to realize many 
elements of human dignity—work, education, family life, non-
discrimination, political expression—as these exceptional spaces 
operate separately from the rest of the territory and its legal 
framework.  
What does this mean for the future of refugee protection? 
The refugee framework reflects historical realities and power 
dynamics.  Accordingly, refugee protection has always been 
political.8 Barring any seismic shifts in the state-based international 
system, this will continue to be the reality.  But conceptual shifts are 
possible.  By understanding migration through a human rights lens, 
we can move away from dichotomies between good and bad, 
deserving and criminal, or political and economic migrants.  
Individuals facing human rights violations of any kind have a right 
to escape these violations, regardless of the nature of the threat and 
whether it fits into the narrowly defined scope of persecution laid 
out in the Refugee Convention. 
The right to escape human rights violations is embedded 
within a broader freedom of movement rooted in human dignity.  
Human dignity is the core concept of human rights.  In considering 
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rights violations, courts have found certain non-enumerated rights 
such as education and work to be integral to human dignity9 and 
have outlawed contentious security practices deemed to violate 
human dignity.10 Similarly, the right to movement is an essential 
component of human dignity, a linkage that Thomas Jefferson 
recognized in characterizing expatriation as an inherent right, 
essential to the pursuit of happiness.11 
Finally, refugee protection is as much local as it is global.  
Rather than speaking exclusively in the lofty language of human 
rights, we need to appeal to local constituencies and their concerns.  
While states reference sovereignty and national security, individuals 
are often focused on more provincial concerns around housing, 
labor, health care, and education.  It is precisely when these interests 
are ignored that populist messages about the dangers of migrants 
resonate.  By focusing on sectors and policies at the local level, we 
can foster support for migrant rights in a way that takes these 
concerns into account.  
The concept of refugee rights as human rights is found 
neither in refugee law nor in state practices around refugee 
protection.  As a result, the refugee has become largely instrumental 
to broader state concerns.  Displaced as a subject of the law, the 
refugee cannot access international or domestic legal protections, as 
states increasingly place refugees in extra-legal spaces.  By 
reconceptualizing refugees and migrants through a human rights 
lens, refugees can re-enter these spaces and reassert their rights.  At 
the same time, moving beyond a purely humanitarian framework 
can serve to challenge populist anti-migrant rhetoric.  
                                                            
9 Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at 
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817 (1999) (finding that the security service’s use of moderate physical pressure 
against suspected terrorists in ticking time bomb situations violated human 
dignity).  
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